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ARTICLE 
SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY STATUTES 
AND THE CULTURE OF FEAR: 
THE CASE FOR MORE MEANINGFUL 
RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW OF FEAR-DRIVEN 
PUBLIC SAFETY LAWS 
DAVID A. SINGLETON* 
[T]hey will come for your kid over the Internet; they will come in 
a truck; they will come in a pickup in the dark of night; they will 
come in the Hollywood Mall in Florida .... There are sickos out 
there. You have to keep your children [very] close to you .... 
-Geraldo Rivera I 
We had better learn to doubt our inflated fears before they destroy 
us. Valid fears have their place; they cue us to danger. False and 
[overdrawn] fears only cause hardship. 
-Barry Glassner2 
INTRODUCTION 
Seventeen states and an increasing number of municipalities have 
passed laws prohibiting people convicted of sex offenses3 from residing 
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Salmon Chase College of Law. Northern Kentucky Univer-
sity; Lecturer of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; Executive Director, Ohio Justice 
& Policy Center; A.B., Duke University; J.D., Harvard Law School. I am very appreciative of the 
time, insights, and assistance provided by the following individuals: Mark Loudon-Brown, Andrea 
Yang, Stephen JohnsonGrove, Andrew Amend, Jennifer Walters, Sehar Siddiqi and Sheila Don-
aldson Johnson. I would not have been able to complete this Article without the support of my 
wife, Verna Williams. This Article is dedicated to the memory of my mother and father. 
I. The Geraldo Rivera Show, "Lured Away: How to Get Your Child Back; Panelists Dis-
cuss Their Horrifying Experiences of Losing Children Through Abductions and Murders; Tips 
Are Offered on Keeping Children Safe," (Jose Pretlow Dec. 4, 1997) (TV broadcast) (statement of 
Geraldo Rivera). 
2. Barry Glassner, The Culture of Fear: Why Americans Are Afraid of the Wrong Things 
(Basic Books 1999). 
3. "Sex offenders," the label commonly used to refer to these individuals, is one this author 
would prefer not to use. It implies that individuals so labeled inevitably will re-offend. However, 
contrary to what most people believe, most people who commit sex offenses do not recidivate 
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near places where children congregate, such as schools, parks, day cares, 
and playgrounds.4 These laws reflect the public's growing fear of sex of-
fenders and outrage at the crimes they commit.s 
But do sex offender residency statutes actually protect children, or do 
they undermine community safety? Are these laws common sense, appro-
priate responses to a serious threat posed to the nation's children, or are 
they fear-driven reactions to high-profile media coverage of child abduction 
and sexual assault cases? Moreover, suppose these restrictions are not based 
on any evidence that they are effective in preventing or reducing child sex-
ual abuse, but are instead hot-blooded legislative responses to public outcry 
generated from extensive media coverage of child abduction cases. Under 
such circumstances, should a court, faced with an equal protection chal-
lenge to the law, apply a toothless, highly deferential rational basis analy-
sis? Or, should the court conduct a more meaningful review-with bite? 
This Article argues that sex offender residency restrictions are driven 
primarily by fear and dislike of sex offenders, not reasoned analysis of what 
is necessary to protect children. Accordingly, courts, when considering 
equal protection challenges to such laws, should eschew highly deferential 
rational basis review for a more rigorous standard. 
Part I analyzes the media's role in shaping and distorting public per-
ception of crime and safety issues in the United States. 
Part II discusses the development and proliferation of sex offender 
residency restrictions as a response to high-profile media coverage of child 
abduction cases. Part II also examines whether residency restrictions are 
effective in reducing child sexual abuse and concludes that these laws are 
likely ineffective and potentially counterproductive. 
Part III argues that courts, applying rational basis review, should more 
closely scrutinize sex offender residency restrictions because such laws are 
motivated primarily by fear and dislike of sex offenders rather than rea-
soned analysis of what is necessary and appropriate to protect children from 
sexual abuse. Part III discusses United States Department of Agriculture v. 
Moreno,6 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,7 and Romer v. Ev-
ans8-three cases in which the United States Supreme Court held that clas-
sifications driven by fear and dislike of politically unpopular groups are 
irrational under the rational basis standard. Although Moreno, Cleburne, 
sexually. This will be discussed infra Part II. Although the author would prefer to avoid use of the 
tenn "sex offender," this Article will nonetheless use it for the sake of convenience. 
4. These laws are discussed in more detail, infra. 
5. Wendy Koch, States Get Tougher with Sex Offenders, USA Today (May 23, 2(06) 
(available at http://www.usatoday.comlnews/nationl2006-05-23-sex-offenders_x.htm) ("Public 
fear of sex offenders is spurring a wave of tougher laws this year, both in Congress and state-
houses nationwide."). 
6. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
7. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
8. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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and Romer provide a conceptual basis for closer scrutiny of fear and 
prejudice-based classifications, those cases, in and of themselves, do not 
provide a sufficient framework for analyzing the type of statute at issue 
here. Unlike the classifications at issue in those cases, which the Court 
found to be solely motivated by fear or a desire to harm a politically unpop-
ular group, sex offender residency statutes are ostensibly motivated by a 
legitimate and important governmental purpose: the protection of children 
from sexual abuse. This public safety rationale, however, should not shield 
sex offender residency statutes from meaningful scrutiny of whether the 
means chosen by the legislature-prohibiting sex offenders from living 
within a certain distance of places where children are likely to congregate-
further the stated goal of protecting children from sexual abuse. Part III 
argues that because sex offender residency statutes are largely the result of 
media-generated fear and dislike of sex offenders, courts should look be-
hind the stated public-safety goals to examine more closely the question of 
whether these statutes actually protect children. 
Part IV proposes a framework for courts to use in determining whether 
a law, with an ostensibly permissible goal, is nonetheless impermissibly 
fear-based and therefore irrational. 
Part V applies this new framework from Part IV to a hypothetical 
equal protection challenge to Ohio's sex offender residency law. 
I. CRIME, THE MEDIA, AND THE CULTURE OF FEAR 
A. News Reporting of Crime 
Americans are preoccupied with fear, particularly fear of crime.9 News 
coverage of crime is at least partially responsible for this fear.1O Violent 
crime dominates news reporting in the United States. II Crime is often the 
most prominently featured subject in the local news and in some markets 
accounts for more than 75 percent of local coverage. 12 Crime is also widely 
covered in national news outlets. 13 For example, although the national 
crime rate fell 20 percent from 1990 to 1998, network television coverage 
of crime increased 83 percent. 14 Moreover, network news coverage of 
9. See e.g. Glassner, supra n. 2; Bowling for Columbine (Michael Moore 2002) (motion 
picture); Marc Siegel, False Alarm: The Truth About the Epidemic of Fear (John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. 2005). 
10. See David L. Altheide, Creating Fear: News and the Construction of Crisis 22 (Aldine 
De Gruyter 2002). 
I I. Lori Dorfman & Vincent Schiraldi, Off Balance: Youth, Race & Crime in the News 8, 
http://www .buildingblocksforyouth.org/medialmedia. pdf (200 I). 
12. Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Tele-
vision News on the Viewing Public, 44 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 560, 560 (2000). 
13. Dorfman & Schiraldi, supra n. II, at 8; etr. for Media & Pub. Affairs, 1998 Year in 
Review: T. V. 's Leading News Topics, Reporters, and Political Jokes, 13 Media Monitor I, 2 
(1999). 
14. Dorfman & Schiraldi, supra n. 11, at 10. 
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homicides increased 473 percent during that period, despite a 32.9 percent 
decrease in the homicide rate. 15 
Although researchers may disagree about the cause and effect relation-
ship between media coverage of crime and public perception of crime, 16 
there is evidence that the former influences the latter. For example, 80 per-
cent of respondents in a 1997 Los Angeles Times poll stated that the media's 
coverage of violent crime increased their fear of becoming victims, with 52 
percent stating that they felt "much more fearful" of being victimized as a 
result of news coverage of crime.17 Moreover, three-quarters of the public 
form their opinions about crime based on news reports-more than three 
times the number of people who form their opinions based on personal 
experience. 18 
Crime reporting has become an increasingly popular method for 
budget-pressed news agencies to boost ratings. 19 As one author has ob-
served, "[t]he media profit from fear mongering through sensationalized 
headlines. Nothing gets viewers to tune in to a news program like fear: fear 
of war, fear of disease, fear of death, fear of harm coming to loved ones."20 
Not all crime, however, is deemed newsworthy by the media. Among 
the factors that influence the likelihood that the media will cover a particu-
lar crime are the existence of multiple victims or offenders, the presence of 
a white victim, the unusualness of the crime, and the occurrence of the 
crime in an affluent community.21 In short, the more peculiar or unusual the 
crime, the more likely the media will cover it.22 
The media's coverage of crime often creates a misleading picture of a 
nation far more dangerous and violent than it is in actuality.23 Public per-
ception is skewed as a result of two phenomena: the "vividness" and the 
"availability" biases described by social psychologist John Ruscio.24 Ac-
cording to Ruscio, "[s]tories featuring mundane, commonplace events don't 
stand a chance of making it onto the six o'clock news. The stories that do 
make it through this painstaking selection process are then crafted into ac-
IS. [d. 
16. Altheide, supra n. 10, at 24 (describing the disagreement and citing to conflicting 
studies). 
17. Greg Braxton, Ratings vs. Crime Rates, L.A. Times B I (June 4, 1997). 
18. Dorfman & Schiraldi, supra n. II, at 4. 
19. Nicholas A. Valentino, Crime News and the Priming of Racial Attitudes During Evalua-
tions of the President, 63 Pub. Op. Q. 293, 297 (1999). 
20. Benjamin Radford, Media Myth Makers: How Journalists, Activists, and Advertisers 
Mislead Us 66 (Prometheus Books 2003). 
21. Dorfman & Schiraldi, supra n. 11, at 8; Steven Chermak, Predicting Crime Story Sali-
ence: The Effects of Crime, Victim, and Defendallt Characteristics, 26 J. Crim. Just. 61, 62 (1998). 
22. John Ruscio, Risky Business: Vividness, Availability, and the Media Paradox, 24 Skepti-
cal Inquirer 22, 25 (Mar./ Apr. 2(00) ("Events must be somewhat unusual in order to be consid-
ered newsworthy."). 
23. Dorfman & Schiraldi, supra n. 11, at 7. 
24. Ruscio, supra n. 22, at 23. 
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counts emphasizing their concrete, personal and emotional context."25 This 
is the "vividness" bias factor. The other phenomenon is the "availability" 
bias.26 According to Ruscio, "our judgments of frequency and probability 
are heavily influenced by the ease with which we can imagine or recall 
instances of an event.'027 Thus, because we do not carefully evaluate "all the 
logically possible events weighted by their actual frequency of occurrence, 
the simple presence of one memory and absence of another can short-circuit 
a fully rational evaluation."28 
Perhaps it is not surprising that Americans believe the country has be-
come increasingly dangerous. As Dorfman and Schiraldi observe, "to the 
uninitiated news consumer, those unaware that reporters and editors make a 
series of choices about what goes into the newspaper or TV broadcast, the 
regular diet of unusual over time seems usual."29 
But does obsessive fear of crime make us any safer? The Culture of 
Fear author Barry Glassner writes: "One of the paradoxes of a culture of 
fear is that serious problems remain widely ignored even though they give 
rise to precisely the dangers that the populace most abhors."30 
B. News Coverage of Child Abduction Cases 
Media coverage of child abduction cases has grown significantly dur-
ing the past two decades. The following examples illustrate this trend. 
On July 27, 1981, six-year-old Adam Walsh was abducted from a mall 
in Hollywood, Florida.31 Walsh and his mother entered a Sears store where 
Walsh began playing with a video game while his mother shopped. When 
his mother returned, Walsh had vanished. After two hours of frantic but 
fruitless searching for Walsh, the police were called. Two weeks later, 
Walsh's severed head was found 120 miles from where he was kidnapped. 
Ottis Toole, a serial killer, confessed to the crime on two occasions but 
subsequently recanted. He died in prison without ever being charged for 
Walsh's death. A Westlaw search generated two articles about the Walsh 
case during the first year after the crime occurred?2 A LexisNexis search 
revealed thirteen articles during that same time period.33 
25. /d. at 23. 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. at 24. 
29. Dorfman & Schiraldi, supra n. II, at 31. 
30. Glassner, supra n. 2, at xviii. 
31. Courtroom TV Network, Child Abduction: Adam and Polly, http://www.crimelibrary. 
comicriminaLmindipsychology/child_abduction/9.html (accessed Sept. 15, 2006) [hereinafter 
Adam and Polly]. The additional facts of the Walsh case, as reported herein, were obtained from 
the aforementioned source. 
32. The Westlaw search was conducted in the US NEWS database using the following search 
terms: "Adam Walsh" & DA(AFf 7/27/1981 & BEF 712711982). 
33. The LexisNexis search was conducted in the News, All (English, Full Text) database 
using the following search terms: "Adam Walsh" and date(geq (7/27/1981) and leq(7/2711982)). 
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On October 22, 1989, eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling was abducted 
near his home in St. Joseph, Minnesota.34 Wetterling, his brother and a 
friend had just returned from a local convenience store. On the way home, a 
gun-wielding masked man confronted the boys. The man grabbed Wet-
terling and led him into the woods. Wetterling was never seen again and his 
body was never recovered. The identity of his attacker is unknown. In 1994, 
Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexu-
ally Violent Offender Registration Act as part of the Federal Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994?5 The Jacob Wetterling Act 
requires states to implement a sex offender and crimes-against-children reg-
istry.36 A Westlaw search generated 375 articles about the Wetterling case 
during the first year after the crime occurred?7 A LexisNexis search re-
vealed sixty-three articles during that same time period.38 
On October 1, 1993, twelve-year-old Polly Klaas was kidnapped from 
her home at knifepoint during a slumber party?9 Thousands of local re-
sidents joined what would become one of the largest manhunts in United 
States history. Unfortunately, Klaas was found murdered. The man who 
abducted and killed her, Richard Allen Davis, was sentenced to death. A 
Westlaw search generated 2,751 articles during the first year after the crime 
occurred.40 A LexisN exis search revealed 1,504 articles during that same 
time period.41 
Seven-year-old Megan Kanka was abducted from her home on July 29, 
1994.42 Two days later she was found murdered by a convicted sex offender 
who lived nearby. In 1994, New Jersey passed the first "Megan's Law" in 
the country, which required community notification of the presence of cer-
34. Jacob Wetterling Foundation, Jacob Wetterling Story, http://www.jwfjfw.org/ReadAr-
ticle.asp?articlelD=34 (accessed Sept. 16, 2006). The additional facts of the Wetterling case, as 
reported herein, were obtained from the aforementioned source. 
35. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796,2038 (1994); codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14071(a) (2006). 
36. /d. 
37. The Westlaw search was conducted in the USNEWS database using the following search 
terms: "Jacob Wetterling" & DA(AFT 10/22/1989 & BEF 10/22/1990). 
38. The LexisNexis search was conducted in the News, All (English, Full Text) database 
using the following search terms: "Jacob Wetterling" and date(geq (10/22/1989) and leq (10/22/ 
1990». 
39. Adam and Polly, supra n. 31, at http://www.crimeJibrary.comlcriminal_mind/psychol-
ogy/chiJd_abduction/9.html. The additional facts of the Klaas case, as reported herein, were ob-
tained from the aforementioned source. 
40. The Westlaw search was conducted in the USNEWS database using the following search 
terms: "Polly Klaas" & DA(AFT 10/1/1993 & BEF 10/1/1994). 
41. The LexisNexis search was conducted in the News, All (English, Full Text) database 
using the following search terms: "Polly Klaas" and date(geq (9/10/1/1993) and leq (9/10/1/ 
1994». 
42. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Megan Kanka, http://en.wikidpedia.org/wiki/Megan 
_Kanka (accessed Sept. 16,2006). The additional facts of the Kanka case, as reported herein, were 
obtained from the aforementioned source. 
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tain sex offenders in the community.43 In 1996, the federal Megan's Law 
was passed.44 The federal provision requires all fifty states to implement 
some form of community notification of sex offenders.45 A Westlaw search 
generated 630 articles during the first year after the crime occurred.46 A 
LexisNexis search revealed 332 articles during the same time period.47 
On February 1, 2004, eleven-year-old Carlie Brucia took a shortcut 
through the parking lot of a carwash on her way home.48 She never made it. 
A video camera captured a man, Joseph Smith, approaching her and leading 
her away. Brucia's body was found less than a week later. A Westlaw 
search generated 3,318 articles about the Brucia case during the first year 
after the crime occurred.49 A LexisN exis search revealed 1,163 articles dur-
ing the same time period.50 
Jessica Lunsford, a nine-year-old Florida girl, was abducted from her 
home on February 23, 2005, and murdered a short time thereafter by a con-
victed sex offender, John Couey.51 Lunsford was buried alive with a stuffed 
animal. A Westlaw search generated 6,510 articles about the Lunsford case 
during the first year after the crime occurred. 52 A LexisNexis search re-
vealed 2,563 articles during the same time period. 53 
The coverage of these cases follows certain trends. First, coverage has 
grown exponentially since Adam Walsh's murder. The LexisNexis database 
contained only thirteen articles about the Walsh case during the first year 
after his disappearance, compared to the more than 2,500 articles that ap-
peared in LexisNexis for the first year after the Jessica Lunsford murder. 
43. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-2 (2006). 
44. Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2(d), 110 Stat. 1345, 1345 (1996); codified at 42 U.S.c. 
§ 14071(e)(2) (2006). 
45. [d. 
46. The Westlaw search was conducted in the USNEWS database using the following search 
terms: "Megan Kanka" & DA(AFT 7/29/1994 & BEF 7/2911995). 
47. The LexisNexis search was conducted in the News, All (English, Full Text) database 
using the following search terms: "Megan Kanka" and date(geq(71291l994) and leq(7/2911995». 
48. Charles Montaldo, About.com, Carlie Brucia: A Child Is Abducted on Videotape, http:// 
crime.about.com/odlcurrent/a/carliebrucia.htm (accessed Sept. 12, 2006). The additional facts of 
the Brucia case, as reported herein, were obtained from the aforementioned source. 
49. The Westlaw search was conducted in the US NEWS database using the following search 
terms: "Carlie Brucia" & DA(AFT 2/1/2004 & BEF 21112005). 
50. The LexisNexis search was conducted in the News, All (English, Full Text) database 
using the following search terms: "Carlie Brucia" and date(geq(2/1/2004) and leq(2/l/2005». 
51. Susan Candiotti & Paul Courson, CNN.com Law Center, Sheriff: Evidence Points to Sex 
Abuse, http://www.cnn.coml2005ILAW/03/20/lunsford.case/index.html(last updated Mar. 21, 
2(05). 
52. The Westlaw search was conducted in the USNEWS database using the following search 
terms: "Jessica Lunsford" & DA(AFr 2/23/2005 & BEF 2/2312(06). 
53. The LexisNexis search was conducted in the News, All (English, Full Text) database 
using the following search terms: "Jessica Lunsford" and date(geq(2123112005) and leq(2/231 
2006)). 
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Second, each of these cases involved white victims,54 who, as discussed 
above, are generally deemed more worthy of coverage than victims of 
color.55 Third, all but two of these cases involved abductions from the vic-
tim's home. Again, this factor increases the unusualness of the incident, 
which heightens the media's interest in the story.56 
II. SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS 
A. Development and Proliferation 
Currently, seventeen states restrict where sex offenders can live. The 
first seven of these laws were passed in the 1990s, beginning with Florida,57 
Delaware58 and Michigan59 in 1995. In 1998, legislatures in Alabama,60 
Califomia,61 and Illinois62 enacted residency restrictions. Indiana followed 
suit in 1999.63 
From 2000 to 2004, ten states passed sex offender residency restric-
tions, beginning with Kentucky64 in 2000, followed by Oregon65 and Loui-
54. See Adam and Polly, supra n. 31 (see picture of Adam Walsh at the top of page); Jacob 
Wetterling Story, supra n. 34 (see picture of Jacob Wetterling to the left of the text); Adam and 
Polly, supra n. 31 (see picture of Polly in the second photo from the top); Megan Kanka, supra n. 
42 (see picture of Megan to the right of the text); Carlie Brucia: A Child Is Abducted on Video-
tape. supra n. 48 (see picture of Carlie Brucia to the right of the text); Candiotti & Courson, supra 
n. 51 (see picture of Jessica Lunsford in the bottom of three images in the Video box). 
55. Romer, 517 U.S. 620. 
56. Radford, supra n. 20, at 8; Sharmak, supra n. 21, at 62; Ruscio, supra n. 22, at 25. 
57. Fla. Stat. § 947.1405(7) (2006) (enacted 1995). Florida's law prohibits offenders, con-
victed of sexually assaulting children, from living within 1,000 feet of a school, day care center, 
park, playground or other place where children regularly congregate. 
58. II Del. Code Ann. tit. II, § 1112(a) (2006) (enacted 1995). Delaware's law prohibits sex 
offenders from living within 500 feet of school property. 
59. Mich. Compo Laws § 28.735[1], 28.733(f) (2006) (enacted 1995). Michigan's law pro-
hibits sex offenders from living within "student safety zones," defined as "1,000 feet or less from 
school property." 
60. Ala. Code § 15-20-26 (2006). Alabama's law, as Originally enacted, prohibited sex of-
fenders from residing within 1,000 feet of schools and child care facilities. It was amended in 
2000 to increase the buffer zone to 2,000 feet. 
61. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3003 (West 2(06). California's provision bars sex offenders on 
parole from living within one-quarter mile of schools. 
62. 720 Ill. Compo Stat. Ann. 5/11-9.3 (b-5) (2006). Illinois' law prohibits "child sex offend-
ers" from residing within 500 feet of school premises. 
63. Ind. Code Ann. § 11-13-3-4(g)(2)(B) (2006). The law, as originally enacted, prohibited 
sex offenders on parole from residing within 1,000 feet of school property unless the offender 
obtained written permission from the parole board. The Indiana law was recently amended to add 
public parks and youth program centers as places sex offenders are barred from living near. 2006 
Ind. Acts 12. The amendment became effective on July 1,2006. 
64. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17.495 (West 2(05). This law, as originally enacted, prohibited sex 
offenders from living within 1,000 feet of schools and day care centers. The law was recently 
amended to include publicly owned playgrounds and extend all restrictions to force an offender 
from their residence if any of the facilities in the statute moves within 1,000 feet of the offender. 
65. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 144.642 (2006). Oregon's law requires the parole authorities to 
adopt residence requirements prohibiting certain paroled sex offenders from residing "near loca-
tions where children are the primary occupants." 
608 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS fA W JOURNAL [Vol. 3:3 
siana66 in 2001, and Iowa67 in 2002. In 2003, legislatures in Georgia,68 
Arkansas,69 Ohio,70 and Oklahoma7l passed residency restrictions. Similar 
laws in Tennessee72 and Missouri73 became effective in 2004. Mississippi 
passed new residency restrictions in 2006.74 Moreover, as this Article goes 
to press, sex offender residency bills are pending in eleven states: Ari-
zona,75 Colorado,76 Indiana,77 Kansas,78 Maryland,79 Massachusetts,8o 
66. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:91.1 (2006). As originally enacted, the statute prohibited sexu-
ally violent predators from living within 1,000 feet of schools, 2004 La. Acts 178. In 2004, the 
Louisiana legislature amended the statute by adding day care centers, playgrounds, public and 
private youth centers, swimming pools and free standing video arcades to the list of places sex 
offenders were barred from living near. 
67. Iowa Code § 692A.2A (2006). 
68. Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-15 (2006). The law as originally enacted prohibits registered sex 
offenders from living within 1,000 feet of child care facilities, schools and other areas where 
children congregate, including public and private park and recreation facilities, playgrounds, and 
neighborhood centers. 2006 Ga. Laws 571. On July I, 2006, an amendment to the Georgia law 
forbid sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of school bus stops. 
69. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-128 (2006) Arkansas' law bars certain sex offenders from resid-
ing within 2,000 feet of schools and day cares. 
70. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.031 (West 2006). Ohio's law prohibits sex offenders from 
residing within 1,000 feet of schools. 
71. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 590 (2006). Oklahoma's law prohibits sex offenders from living 
within 2,000 feet of any public or private school site or educational institution. 
72. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-211 (2006). Tennessee's law prohibits sex offenders, whose 
victims were minors, from living within 1,000 feet of schools and licensed day care facilities. 
73. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.147 (2006). Missouri's law bars certain sex offenders from residing 
within 1,000 feet of schools and child care facilities. 
74. Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-25 (2006). Mississippi's law prohibits sex offenders from liv-
ing within 1,500 feet of schools or day cares. 
75. Ariz. H. 2380, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Jan. 25, 2006) (would prohibit sexually violent 
offenders on community supervision from residing within 440 feet of school property). 
76. Colo. H. 1089, 65th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (Jan. 13,2006) (would prohibit sexu-
ally violent predators from residing within 1,500 feet of a school, day care center or playground). 
77. Ind. Sen. 12, I 14th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (Jan. 10, 2006) (would prohibit sex 
offenders on parole from residing within 1,000 feet of school property, unless the offender obtains 
a waiver from the parole board). 
78. Kan. Sen. 506, 81st Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Mar. 22, 2006) (would prohibit sex offenders 
from residing within 2,000 feet of licensed child care facilities, registered family day care homes 
or the real property of any school). 
79. Md. H. 942, 421st Gen. Assembly, 2006 Reg. Sess. (Feb. 9, 2006) (would prohibit sex 
offenders required to register for life from residing within one mile of an elementary or secondary 
school or a park where children regularly congregate). 
80. Mass. H. 889, I 84th Gen. Ct., 2005 Reg. Sess. (Jan. 5, 2005) (would prohibit sex offend-
ers from residing within one mile of schools). 
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Nebraska,8' New Jersey,82 New York,83 South Carolina,84 and Rhode 
Island.85 
Furthermore, since 2005, numerous municipalities across the country 
have proposed or passed residency restrictions prohibiting sex offenders 
from residing near schools and other places where children are likely to 
congregate.86 
As the enactment dates of these statutes illustrate, sex offender resi-
dency restrictions are likely a response to high-profile media coverage of 
child abduction cases. It is probably no accident that passage of the first 
sex offender residency restrictions in 1995 followed on the heels of the 
Klaas and Kanka murders in 1993 and 1994, respectively. Prior to the Klaas 
81. Neb. Leg. Res. 867, 99th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Jan. 5, 2(06) (would prohibit high-risk sex 
offenders from residing within 1,000 feet of schools and child care facilities). 
82. N.J. Assembly 639, 212th Leg. (Jan. 10,2006) (would prohibit sex offenders with minor 
victims from residing within 500 feet of a school, playground or child care center). 
83. N.Y. Assembly 9428, 229th Annual Leg. Sess. (Jan. 11, 2(06) (would prohibit sex of-
fenders from living within 1,000 feet of schools). 
84. S.C. H. 4323, Gen. Assembly, 116th Sess. (Jan. 10,2006) (would prohibit sex offenders 
with minor victims from residing within 1,000 feet of schools, day care centers, children's recrea-
tional facilities, parks, playgrounds, and bus stops). 
85. R.1. H. 7621, 2005-2006 Leg. Sess. (Feb. 16,2(06) (would prohibit child predators from 
residing within 500 feet of day cares, schools, public parks, playgrounds, libraries, and public 
family housing). 
86. See e.g. City of Miami Beach, Fla., Miami Beach City Commission Unanimously Ap-
proves Local Sex Offender Ordinance, http://www.miamibeachfl.gov/newcity/cityhall/mayoc 
dermerlPress%20Release%20-20Sex%200ffender%200rdinance.pdf (June 8, 2005) (press release 
announcing passage of Miami Beach, Florida ordinance prohibiting sex offenders from residing 
within 2,500 feet of schools, parks, and other areas where children congregate); Don Ruane, Cape 
Zones Out Sex Criminals, News-Press (Ft. Myers, Fla.) IA (Jan. 31,2006) (reporting Cape Coral, 
Florida ordinance prohibiting sex offenders from living within 2,500 feet of a school, day care 
center, park or playground); Pervaiz Shallwani, Dublin Adopts Sex Offender Limits, Morning Call 
(Allentown, Pa.) BI (Feb. 14, 2006) (reporting passage of ordinance in Dublin, Pennsylvania 
prohibiting sex offenders from living within 2,500 feet of schools, child care centers, public parks 
and recreation facilities); Liz Neely, Cities Restrict Sex Offenders, San Diego Union-Trib. BI 
(Mar. 19, 2006); Toni Becker, Richland Discusses Sex Offender Restrictions, Free Press (Boyer-
town, Pa.) (Mar. 1. 2006) (discussing proposed ordinance in Richland. Pennsylvania; reponing 
ordinance passed in Lower Makefield Township restricting sex offenders, whose crimes were 
committed against minors, from living within 2,500 feet of schools, parks, playgrounds, child care 
facilities, community centers, and other places where children congregate); Kathy Baratta, Sex 
Offender Ordered to Move, News Transcr. (Freehold, N.J.) (Mar. 22, 2006) (reporting challenge 
to Manalapan, New Jersey ordinance adopted in August 2005 which bans sex offenders from 
living within 2,500 feet of schools, libraries, and other places where children are likely to gather); 
Carnie Young, City to Mull Sex Offender Crackdown, Gwinnett Daily Post (Gwinnett County, 
Ga.) (Mar. 26, 2(06) (reporting proposed ordinance in Snellville City, Georgia prohibiting sex 
offenders from living within 2,500 feet of schools, day cares, parks and playgrounds); Michele 
Besso, Newark Weighs Sex Offender Legislation, News J. (Wilmington, De\.) Al (Mar. 25, 2006) 
(discussing proposed Newark, Delaware ordinance prohibiting sex offenders from residing within 
2,500 feet of parks, playgrounds, and day care centers; reporting similar ordinance passed by the 
town of Bridgeville, Delaware); KFDX 3, New Sex Offender Ordinance Proposed, http://www. 
kfdx.comlnews/default.asp?mode=shownews&id=11494 (Apr. 3, 2006) (reporting proposed ban 
on registered sex offenders living within 1,000 feet of a public park, a school, a youth center or 
certain child care facilities). 
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murder, national coverage of such crimes was comparatively slight. Begin-
ning with the Klaas case, however, media coverage of such crimes ex-
ploded. The increased attention to child abduction cases and the public 
outcry generated thereby likely led to passage of the first restrictions in 
1995. Regardless of the reasons for the first restrictions, there can be little 
doubt that the highly publicized murders of Brucia and Lunsford in 2005 
played a significant role in the spate of new sex offender residency restric-
tions proposed and enacted in 2005 and 2006. 
The following subsections will examine the justifications for sex of-
fender residency statutes and will discuss whether such restrictions are ef-
fective or potentially counterproductive. 
B. Rationales for Residency Restrictions 
There are two primary rationales for sex offender residency restric-
tions: (1) preventing children from being abducted at or near school 
grounds by sex offenders, and (2) reducing opportunities for sex offenders 
who live near schools to "groom" children for purposes of sexual abuse. A 
third reason often cited-more as a means of creating a sense of urgency 
for legislative action to protect children-is the purportedly high recidivism 
rate for sex offenders. Each of these rationales will be discussed below in 
tum. 
1. Preventing child abductions by strangers 
Based on high-profile coverage of certain child abduction cases, many 
people believe that sex offender residency restrictions are necessary to pre-
vent these crimes from recurring. Take, for example, the statement of the 
Iowa lawmaker who sponsored that state's residency restriction: "We hear 
about all the child abductions. We didn't want [sex offenders] living across 
from schools and child-care centers, looking out the windows at all the kids 
across the street."87 Although media coverage suggests that child abduc-
tions are commonplace, these crimes-tragic as they are-are rare. 
Every year, approximately 100 children are abducted by strangers and 
killed in the United States.88 Moreover, less than one percent of all murders 
involve sexual assault, and in fact, the prevalence of sexual murders de-
clined by about half between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s.89 
Additionally, most victims of child sexual assaults know their abuser. 
A 2000 Department of Justice study found that 93 percent of child sexual 
87. Alex Tom, Abusers' Housing Options Severely Limited, Des Moines Register IA (Aug. 
26, 2002) (quoting St. Sen. Jerry Behn). 
88. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, Frequently Asked Questions and 
Statistics http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/serv letIPageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_ US 
&Pageld=242 (accessed Sept. 21, 2(06). 
89. Bureau of Just. Statistics, Sex Offenses and Offenders: An Analysis of Data on Rape and 
Sexual Assault 27, http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/soo.pdf (Feb. 1997). 
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assault victims knew their perpetrator; 34.2 percent were family members 
and 58.7 percent were acquaintances.9o Only seven percent of child victims 
reported that strangers abused them.91 Thus, rather than representing the 
norm, crimes like the Kanka and Lunsford abductions are the exceptions. 
If preventing abductions of children by strangers is the goal of sex 
offender residency statutes, it is not likely that these restrictions advance 
that goal in any meaningful way. Someone who is determined enough to 
snatch a child from the street-a brazen crime indeed-would likely not be 
deterred or limited from doing so by a residency restriction. This was essen-
tially the conclusion of the Minnesota Department of Corrections, which, at 
the request of the Minnesota legislature, released a study in 2003 that ex-
amined the likely effectiveness of a proposal to ban sex offenders from 
residing within 1,500 feet of schools and parks. The study reached the fol-
lowing conclusions: 
Based on the examination of [the highest risk offenders], there 
were no examples that residential proximity to a park or school 
was a contributing factor in any of the sexual re-offenses [ob-
served in the study]. Enhanced safety due to proximity restric-
tions may be a comfort factor for the general public, but it does 
not have any basis in fact. The two [high risk] offenders [in the 
study] whose re-offenses took place near parks both drove from 
their residences to park areas that were several miles away .... 
Based on these cases, it appears that a sex offender attracted to 
such locations for purposes of committing a crime is more likely 
to travel to another neighborhood in order to act in secret rather 
than in a neighborhood where his or her picture is well known.92 
In 2004, the Colorado Department of Public Safety conducted a similar 
study. The Colorado researchers concluded: "Placing restrictions on the lo-
cation of . . . supervised sex offender residences may not deter the sex 
offender from re-offending and should not be considered as a method to 
control sexual offending recidivism."93 
The Minnesota and Colorado reports are the only studies to examine 
the effectiveness of sex offender residency statutes. Both reports, however, 
reached the conclusion that these restrictions are not effective in protecting 
children from sexual abuse. 
90. Bureau of Just. Statistics, Sexual Assault of Young Children as Reported to Law Enforce-
ment: Victim, Incident, and Offender Characteristics 10, http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/ 
saycrle.pdf (July 20(0). 
91. Id. 
92. Minn. Dept. of Corrections, Level Three Sex Offenders Residential Placement Issues: 
2003 Report to the Legislature 9, http://www.doc.state.mn.us/publications!legislativereports/pdfl 
2004/Lvl %203 % 20SEX % 200FFENDERS % 20report %202003 %20(revis ed%202-04).pdf (Jan. 
2003). 
93. Colo. Dept. of Pub. Safety, Report on Safety Issues Raised by Living Arrangements for 
and Location of Sex Offenders in the Community 5, http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsomlSex_Offender/ 
SO]dfslFullSLAFinalOl.pdf (Mar. 15, 2004). 
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2. Limiting opportunities for child molesters to groom children 
Although sex offender residency restrictions may be driven primarily 
by fear of child abductions, at least one state has raised another rationale in 
defense of its statute: reducing the opportunity for sex offenders to groom 
potential victims. 
According to James Orlando, an expert hired by the State of Ohio, 
residency restrictions reduce sex offenders' access and opportunity to sexu-
ally abuse children, a vulnerable population.94 This is important, according 
to Orlando, because children are usually sexually assaulted by people they 
knoW.95 Therefore, according to Orlando, prohibiting sex offenders from 
living near schools limits their opportunities to establish relationships with 
children whom they can later "groom" for purposes of sexual abuse.96 
Moreover, according to Orlando, prohibiting all sex offenders from living 
near schools, even those offenders whose offenses did not involve children, 
is reasonable because "it is not possible to predict which offenders who 
were previously convicted of an adult offense will cross over to molest 
children. "97 
The problem with this rationale is that children live in many places 
throughout a given community, not just near schools. This point was driven 
home by GIS98 map data produced in a case involving a Clermont County, 
Ohio sex offender who was defending himself from eviction pursuant to the 
state's residency law.99 The evidence showed that of the twelve sex offend-
ers who, as a result of the residency restriction, relocated within the county 
to addresses that were more than 1,000 feet from a school, seven moved to 
residences that were more densely populated with children compared to the 
previous address (a net increase of 4.10 children per acre), whereas five 
offenders moved to residences that were less densely populated with chil-
dren (a net decrease of 1.79 children per acre).100 Overall, the net effect of 
the twelve relocations was an increase of 2.97 children per acre.101 Al-
though one might counter that being near a school provides a larger pool of 
potential victims, there's nothing to stop determined child molesters from 
placing themselves in positions where they can have access to large num-
94. Expert Rep. of James A. Orlando at 5-6, Coston v. Petro, 398 F. Supp. 2d 878 (S.D. 
Ohio 2005). 
95. [d. at 5. See discussion supra regarding the percentages of children assaulted by stran-
gers versus people known to the child. 
96. !d. 
97. [d. 
98. GIS refers to "Geographic Information Systems." GIS is a system of computer hardware, 
software and geographic data for capturing, managing, analyzing and displaying all forms of geo-
graphically referenced information. 
99. State v. Billings, No. 2005 CVH 1328 (Ct. of Com. Pleas, Clermont County, Ohio Sept. 
12,2006). 
100. Transcr. of Hearing at 146, State v. Billings, No. 2005 CVH 1328 (Ct. of Com. Pleas, 
Clermont County, Ohio May 30, 2006). 
!OJ. !d. 
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bers of children-regardless of whether or not the child molesters live 
nearby a school. 
3. "High" sex offender recidivism rates 
Proponents of sex offender residency restrictions often argue that such 
measures are necessary in light of sex offenders' purportedly high recidi-
vism rates. 102 Some courts have cited to sex offender recidivism as a reason 
for upholding residency restrictions against constitutional attack. 103 Recent 
research, however, calls this rationale into question. For example, the De-
partment of Justice found that 5.3 percent of sex offenders were rearrested 
for a new sex crime within three years after release from prison. 104 Moreo-
ver, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction reported an 11 
percent recidivism rate within ten years of release from incarceration, mea-
sured by conviction and return to prison for a new sex offense or a sexually 
related parole violation, such as possession of pornography.105 The Ohio 
study characterized sex-offense recidivism as a "fairly unusual" occur-
rence. 106 Additionally, Canadian researchers reported a 14 percent sex-of-
fense recidivism rate in a study of 29,000 sex offenders in North America 
and Europe. 107 
It is true that child molesters have higher recidivism rates than sex 
offenders who victimize adults. For example, a study completed by Cana-
dian researchers reported over a 20 percent recidivism rate for child molest-
102. See e.g. Hearing on Theater Continued until Aug. 4, Courier-Post (Cherry Hill, N.J,) B, 
2G (July 9, 2005) ("Sex offenders statistically have a high rate of recidivism and are know[n] to 
prey on children," quoting Committeeman Barry M. Wright in explaining why Winslow Town-
ship, New Jersey passed a law banning sex offenders from living within 2,500 feet of a school, 
park, playground, library, day care center or church); Sheila McLaughlin, Sex Offender Told to 
Move from Loveland, Cincinnati Enquirer 2C (June 30, 2005) ("In my experience as a prosecutor, 
sex offenders have a high rate of recidivism, and we don't want to take any chances," quoting 
Mayor Brad Greenberg explaining Loveland, Ohio's decision to enforce state law prohibiting sex 
offenders from living within 1,000 feet of schools); John Sanko, Sex-Offender Bill Eyed; Mom 
Says Proposed Study Doesn't Go Far Enough, Rocky Mt. News (Denver, Colo.) 16A (Feb. 28, 
2002) (sex offenders have a "high likelihood of recidivism," quoting Colorado State Sen. Mary 
Ellen Epps in support of a bill requiring a study of the potential threat from sex offenders living 
near schools and other areas where children congregate; as discussed below, however, the study 
recommended against enactment of a sex offender residency law and no such provision has been 
adopted statewide in Colorado to date), 
103. See e.g. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 716 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 757 
(2005). 
104. Bureau of Just. Statistics, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released From Prison in 199430, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf (Nov. 2003). 
105. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Correction, Ten-Year Recidivism Follow-Up of 1989 Sex Of-
fender Releases 10-11, 24, http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/Reportsrren_ Year_Recidivism,pdf 
(Apr. 2001), 
106. ld. at 12. 
107, See R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of 
Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. Consulting & Clinical Psycho!. 348, 351 (1998); R. Karl 
Hanson & Kelly Morton-Bourgon, Predictors of Sexual Recidivism: An Updated Meta·Analysis 8 
(Pub. Safety & Emerg. Preparedness Canada 2004). 
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ers.108 Older studies, however, have reported much higher recidivism rates. 
A study led by Robert A. Prentky reported a recidivism rate as high as 52 
percent. 109 Drawing conclusions about current recidivism rates from the 
Prentky study is unwarranted though, because Prentky's subjects were sex 
offenders released from prison during the period 1959-1985, well before 
treatment became more available and more effectiveYo Additionally, the 
study's subjects were the "worst of the worst" offenders-individuals who 
were civilly committed for aggressive or repeat sex offenses. 111 In light of 
the fact that these offenders were not necessarily representative of sex of-
fenders generally, the authors issued two caveats: (l) "[t]he obvious, 
marked heterogeneity of sexual offenders precludes automatic generaliza-
tion of the rates reported here to other samples"; and (2) "these findings 
should not be construed as evidence of the inefficacy of treatment," since 
"the treatment services [available to the subjects of the study] were not 
provided uniformly or systematically and did not conform to a state-of-the-
art model."112 
Admittedly, ascertaining the true rate of recidivism is impossible. Sex 
offenses, like other crimes, are underreported. Moreover, measuring recidi-
vism depends upon how one defines it; for example, measuring recidivism 
by reconviction as opposed to rearrest or reoffense will yield a smaller 
number. 
In any event, however, whether sex offenders recidivate at high, me-
dium or low rates is irrelevant to the question of whether residency statutes 
are effective in protecting children from sexual abuse. As discussed above, 
offenders who are motivated to abduct children who are strangers will do so 
whether or not they live near a school. Additionally, with respect to limiting 
access and opportunity to potential victims, residency restrictions only 
serve to shift the potential risk from one part of the community where chil-
dren are found to another part of the community where children will also 
likely be. If a danger exists that a sex offender living within 1,000 feet of a 
school could groom a child who walks to and from the school past the 
offender's residence, that very same danger would likely exist elsewhere in 
the community, unless sex offenders are banished to the rural outskirts of 
town. While banishment might be a more effective and rational means of 
limiting access and opportunity to offend, it would pose serious constitu-
tional problems. I 13 
108. Hanson & Bussiere, supra n. 107, at 351. 
109. Robert A. Prentky, Austin F. S. Lee, Raymond A. Knight & David Cerce. Recidivism 
Rates Among Child Molesters and Rapists: A Methodological Analysis. 21 L. & Hum. Behav. 635, 
644 (1997). 
110. {d. at 640, 657. 
111. {d. at 637. 
112. {d. at 656-57 (emphasis in original). 
113. A complete discussion of the constitutional problems of banishment is beyond the scope 
of this Article. At least two constitutional problems would arise. The first problem is that banish-
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In sum, there is no evidence that sex offender residency restrictions are 
useful in protecting children from sexual abuse. To the contrary, the only 
studies that exist-the Minnesota and Colorado reports-conclude that 
these restrictions do not protect children. 
C. The Potential Counterproductivity of Sex Offender Residency 
Restrictions 
The preceding subsections examined the question of whether sex of-
fender residency restrictions are effective in protecting children and con-
cluded they are not. This subsection argues that residency restrictions are 
not only ineffective but also potentially counterproductive. 
Researchers have found that stability and support increase the likeli-
hood of successful reintegration for former offenders, and that public poli-
cies that make reintegration more difficult might undermine public 
safety. I 14 With respect to sex offenders specifically, researchers have found 
that isolation, unemployment, depression, and instability correlate with in-
creased recidivism. 115 Thus, sex offender residency restrictions may actu-
ally increase the risk of a sex offender sexually abusing minors by 
increasing the offender's instability and stress level. 116 
ment would violate the fundamental right to travel. Second, because banishment has historically 
been considered punishment, this factor would make it more likely that application of the statute 
to offenders who committed their offenses before the statute's effective date would violate the Ex 
Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. 
114. See e.g. Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry (Ox-
ford U. Press 2(03). 
115. See R. Karl Hanson & Andrew Harris, Dynamic Predictors of Sexual Recidivism, http:// 
ww2.psepc-sppcc.gc.caipublications/correctionsI199801 b_e.pdf (accessed Sept. 8, 2006); R. Karl 
Hanson & Kelly Morton-Bourgon, Predictors of Sexual Recidivism: An Updated Meta-Analysis, 
http://www.mhcp-research.com/200402_e.pdf#search=%22%22Predictors%200f%20Sexual%20 
Recidivism%3A%20An%20Updated%20Meta-Analysis%22%22 (accessed Sept. 8, 2(06); Colo. 
Dept. of Pub. Safety Div. of Crim. Just. Sex Offender Mgt. Bd .. Report on Safety Issues Raised by 
Living Arrangements for and Location of Sex Offenders in the Community, http://dcj.state.co.us/ 
odvsOlnlSex_OffenderISO_PdfslFullSLAFinal.pdf (accessed Sept. 7, 2006); Candace Kruttschnitt, 
Christopher Uggen & Kelly Shelton, Predictors of Desistance Among Sex Offenders: The Interac-
tion of Formal and Informal Social Controls, 17 Just. Q. 61 (2000); see also Jill Levenson & Leo 
P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender Residency Restrictions: 1,000 Feet From Danger or One 
Step From Absurd?, 49 IntI. J. of Offender Therapy and Compo Criminology 168, 172 (2005) 
(reporting that almost half of the sex offenders surveyed in Florida were prevented from living 
with supportive family members because of the state's residency restriction); Minn. Dept. of Cor-
rections, Level Three Sex Offenders Residential Placement Issues: 2003 Report to the Legislature 
9, http://www.doc.state.mn.us/publications!legislativereportsIpdf/2004ILvl%203%20SEX%200F-
FENDERS%2Oreport%202003%20(revised%202-04).pdf (Sept. 7, 2(06) (recommending against 
enactment of a I,SOO-foot residency restriction because it would "pose ... problems, such as a 
high concentration of offenders [in rural areas] with no ties to community; isolation; lack of work, 
education, and treatment options; and an increase in the distance traveled by agents who supervise 
offenders") . 
116. Br. Amicus Curiae of Assoc. for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers at 4-6, Doe V. Miller, 
405 F.3d 700 (brief filed in support of the petition for writ of certiorari). 
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Residency restrictions are also possibly counterproductive for another 
reason: offenders who have a difficult time finding alternative housing 
might be driven "underground" (i.e., they would cease registering an ad-
dress with the sheriff), which would make them much more difficult to 
track and supervise. 117 This potential has become reality in Iowa, which 
prohibits sex offenders whose victims were minors from residing within 
2,000 feet of schools and day care facilities. 118 In January 2006, the Iowa 
County Attorneys Association ("ICAA"), a statewide organization that rep-
resents local prosecutors, released a statement asking the Iowa legislature to 
repeal Iowa's lawY9 Believing that the "2,000 foot residency restriction for 
persons who have been convicted of sex offenses involving minors does not 
provide the protection that was originally intended,"120 the ICAA listed 
fourteen reasons why the legislature should repeal the law.121 One of these 
reasons was that "[l]aw enforcement has observed that the residency restric-
tion is causing offenders to become homeless, to change residences without 
notifying authorities of their new locations, to register false addresses or to 
simply disappear. If they do not register, law enforcement and the public do 
not know where they are living."122 Other reasons included the absence of 
research showing a "correlation between residency restrictions and reducing 
sex offenses against children or improving the safety of children"; the fact 
that "[r]esearch does not support the belief that children are more likely to 
be victimized by strangers at the covered locations than at other places"; 
that "[m]any prosecutors have observed that the numerous negative conse-
quences of [Iowa's] lifetime residency restriction has [sic] caused a reduc-
tion in the number of confessions made by offenders in cases where 
defendants usually confess"; and that fewer defendants charged with sex 
offenses are entering plea agreements. 123 
In sum, the available evidence indicates that sex offender residency 
statutes do not protect children and might increase the danger to the com-
munity. The fact that legislatures have passed these laws without evidence 
of their effectiveness and despite evidence indicating these restrictions are 
potentially counterproductive suggests that these laws are driven primarily 
by fear and dislike of sex offenders. The next section will argue that courts, 
when adjudicating equal protection challenges of sex offender residency 
117. Lisa Henderson, Student Author, Sex Offenders: You are Now Free to Move About the 
Country. An Analysis of Doe v. Miller's Effects on Sex Offender Residential Restrictions 73 U. 
Mo. Kan. City L. Rev. 797, S19 (2OOS). 
lIS. Iowa Code Ann. § 692A.2A (West 2oo6). 
119. Iowa County Attorneys Assn., Statement on Sex Offender Residency Restrictions in Iowa, 
http://www.iowa-icaa.com/ICAA %20ST A TEMENTS/Sex % 200ffender%20Residency%20S tate-
ment%20Feb%2014%2oo6%20for%20website.pdf (accessed Sept. 7, 2oo6). 
120. Id. 
121. /d. 
122. Id. at'll 4. 
123. /d. at'll'll J -2, 13. 
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statutes, should eschew highly deferential rational basis review for more 
rigorous scrutiny given the danger that such laws are infected impermissi-
bly by fear and prejudice. 
III. THE CASE FOR CLOSER SCRUTINY OF SEX OFFENDER 
RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS 
Ever since the King's Bench proclaimed in the Semayne's Case of 
1604 that "the house of anyone is not a castle or privilege but for himself, 
and shall not extend to protect any person who flies to his house,"124 the 
home has received heightened protection in Anglo-American courtS. 125 
Legislatures and courts have made it increasingly clear, however, that the 
well-known maxim "a man's home is his castle" does not apply to sex of-
fenders who live near schools and other places where children congregate. 
Convicted sex offenders like Gerry Porter, a Cincinnati resident who lived 
983 feet from a school (seventeen feet too close under Ohio law) and who 
was evicted from the house he and his wife had owned for the past fourteen 
years,126 are being forced to move from their homes. These evictions raise 
many legal issues, including whether residency restrictions violate equal 
protection. 
When analyzing equal protection claims, courts apply different levels 
of scrutiny to different classifications. Strict scrutiny applies to "suspect" 
classifications based on race or national origin 127 and to classifications that 
infringe upon fundamental rights, such as the right to travel,128 the right to 
vote,129 and the right to privacy. 130 Classifications subject to strict scrutiny 
will only be upheld if the government shows that the classification serves a 
compelling state interest by the least restrictive means. 131 Statutes analyzed 
under this standard are rarely upheld. 132 Intermediate scrutiny requires the 
government to demonstrate that the challenged statute is substantially re-
lated to an important governmental interest. 133 To date, courts have applied 
124. Semayne v. Gresham, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 93a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 198 (K.B. 1604). 
125. See e.g. Jeffries v. Ga. Residential Fin. Auth., 503 F. Supp. 610, 619 (N.D. Ga. 1980) 
(in the context of lease tenninations of federally subsidized housing, the court concluded: "The 
interest at stake here, an individual's interest in remaining in his home, is unquestionably substan-
tial" (citation omitted)). 
126. Sharon Coolidge, Sex Offender Ordered to Move, The Cincinnati Enquirer 3C (Sept. 29, 
2005). 
127. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
128. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-630 (1969). 
129. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
130. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
131. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984). 
132. See e.g. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 
914 (2000); U.S. v. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
133. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
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intermediate scrutiny to discriminatory classifications based on sex or 
illegitimacy. 134 
The most deferential standard is rational basis review. Under that stan-
dard, the party challenging the statute must demonstrate that the classifica-
tion bears no rational relationship to any legitimate legislative purpose or 
governmental objective, or that the classification is unreasonable, arbitrary 
or capricious. 135 This standard, which is highly deferential to legislative 
judgments,136 is a very difficult standard for the party challenging the stat-
ute to meet and has led many a commentator to conclude that it is a tooth-
less standard. 137 One reason cited for deferring to legislative judgments is 
that legislatures are better equipped than courts to conduct fact-finding 
hearings and to weigh the relevant facts necessary for lawmaking. 138 An-
other view is that judicial review is inherently counter-majoritarian. 139 
Under this theory, "statutory law takes its legitimacy from the fact that it 
represents the will of majority, not from the extent or quality of any articu-
lated reasons."140 
A. Doe v. Miller: An Example of Toothless Rational Basis Review of 
Sex Offender Residency Restrictions 
So far only a handful of courts have reached the merits of challenges to 
sex offender residency statutes. 141 The leading decision to date is Doe v. 
Miller,142 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision upholding the con-
134. See e.g. Miss. U. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190,197 (1976). 
135. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446. 
136. See e.g. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (holding that a statute will not be declared unconstitu-
tional so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose "even if [itl seems 
unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenu-
ous"); FCC v. Beach Communs., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) (describing rational basis 
review as a "paradigm of judicial restraint"). 
137. See e.g. Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. I, 8 (1972) (describing rational basis review as 
"minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact"); David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and 
the Public Interest, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. I, 33 n. 89 ("For the most part, rational basis review has 
been notoriously toothless."); Steven I. Friedland, On Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil Com-
mitment of Sex Offenders, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 73, 86 (1999) ("Usually, courts adopt a highly 
deferential approach to protective or preventive state legislation, such as civil commitment laws, 
applying an almost toothless rational basis level of scrutiny."). 
138. See U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
139. Muriel Morisey Spence, What Congress Knows and Sometimes Doesn't Know, 30 U. 
Rich. L. Rev. 653, 662 (1996) (citing Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional 
Determinations. 40 U. Cin. L. Rev. 199,209-10 (1971)). 
140. Id. at 686 (describing two theories of how legislatures make decisions: the will of the 
majority and public choice theory, in which legislation is viewed as the result of compromises 
among competing interests). 
141. See e.g. Doe, 405 F.3d 700; State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005); People v. 
Leroy, 357 Ill. App. 3d 530 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 2005); Lee v. State, 895 So.2d 1038 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 2004); Denson v. Stllte, 267 Ga. App. 528 (Ga. App. 2004). 
142. 405 F.3d 700. 
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stitutionality of Iowa's sex offender residency restriction which prohibits 
sex offenders whose offenses were committed against minors from living 
within 2,000 feet of schools and day cares. 143 In so holding, the Eighth 
Circuit reversed a district court decision declaring the Iowa statute uncon-
stitutional on numerous grounds. 144 
In Doe v. Miller, the Eighth Circuit rejected plaintiff sex offenders' 
argument that Iowa's sex offender residency statute violated their funda-
mental rights to travel and privacy.145 Instead, the Eighth Circuit applied 
rational basis review. The court noted that "[t]here can be no doubt of a 
legislature's rationality in believing that 'sex offenders are a serious threat 
in this Nation,' and that 'when convicted sex offenders reenter society, they 
are much more likely than any other type of offender to be re-arrested for a 
new rape or sexual assault.'" 146 The court then reasoned that the "only 
question remaining is whether, in view of a rationally perceived risk, the 
chosen residency restriction rationally advances the State's interest in pro-
tecting children." 147 
The Eighth Circuit then concluded that the legislature's decision to 
limit where sex offenders reside was rational and one that the legislature 
was better suited than a court to make: "The legislature is institutionally 
equipped to weigh the benefits and burdens of various distances, and to 
reconsider its initial decision in light of experience and data accumulated 
over time.,,148 The court downplayed the significance of the Minnesota 
study that found no relationship between a sex offender's proximity to a 
school or park and sexual recidivism. On this point, the court reasoned: 
"Although the Does introduced one report from the Minnesota Department 
of Corrections finding 'no evidence in Minnesota that residential proximity 
of sex offenders to schools or parks affects reoffense,' this solitary case 
study-which involved only thirteen reoffenders released from prison be-
tween 1997 and 1999-does not make irrational the decision of the Iowa 
General Assembly and the Governor of Iowa to reach a different predictive 
judgment for Iowa."149 Thus, the Eighth Circuit simply assumed the effec-
tiveness of Iowa's law. Moreover, although the Eighth Circuit noted that 
both the state and the plaintiffs' expert agreed that Iowa's statute was po-
143. Iowa Code § 692A.2A. 
144. Doe, 405 F.3d 700. 
145. [d. at 710-14. The Eighth Circuit also held that Iowa's sex offender residency restriction 
did not violate procedural due process, id. at 709; did not violate the Fifth Amendment's privilege 
against self-incrimination, id. at 717-18; and did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, id. at 
718-23. 
146. [d. at 714-15 (quoting Conn. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1,4 (2003». 
147. [d. at 715. 
148. [d. As examples of the ability of legislatures to weigh facts, the Eighth Circuit cited 
Alabama. which increased its law from 1,000 to 2,000 feet, and Minnesota, which chose not to 
pass a residency statute after reviewing a study that recommended against it. 
149. [d. at 714. 
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tentially counterproductive, ISO the court ignored this fact in its rational basis 
review of the statute. 
The absence of any evidence of the effectiveness of Iowa's statute cou-
pled with testimony about its potential counterproductivity should have un-
derscored to the court that the statute was motivated by fear and dislike of 
sex offenders. The court concluded, however, that there was no basis to 
believe that Iowa, in passing the residency restriction, acted "merely on 
negative attitudes toward, fear of, or a bare desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group."ISI 
B. Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer 
In Doe v. Miller, the Eighth Circuit cited City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center1S2 and United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno. 1s3 
These two cases and a third, Romer v. Evans,ls4 merit further discussion, 
for they each provide a conceptual basis for conducting a more ligorous 
review of sex offender residency restrictions. As will be discussed in more 
detail below, however, these cases fail to provide a sufficient framework for 
determining whether sex offender residency restrictions-laws designed to 
protect the public, specifically children, from serious harm-are rational. 
The issue in Moreno was whether a federal regulation denying food 
stamps to groups of individuals who lived together but were unrelated vio-
lated equal protection. ISS The plaintiffs in Moreno were groups of individu-
als who satisfied income eligibility requirements for food stamps but who 
had been denied benefits because the persons in each group were not all 
related to each·other. 1s6 Applying rational basis review, the Supreme Court 
held that "[t]he challenged statutory classification (households of related 
persons versus households containing one or more unrelated persons) is 
clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes of the [Food Stamp] Act," which is 
to provide food assistance to needy individuals. ls7 The Court noted that the 
scant legislative history of the amendment denying benefits to groups of 
unrelated individuals revealed that the amendment "was intended to prevent 
so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from participating in the food 
stamp program."IS8 Thus, the Court concluded, "For if the constitutional 
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the 
150. Jd. at 707-08. 
151. Jd. at 716 (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448). 
152. 473 U.S. 432. 
153. 413 U.S. 528. 
154. 517 U.S. 620. 
ISS. 413 U.S. at 529. 
156. Jd. at 531. 
157. /d. at 534. 
158. Jd. 
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very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpop-
ular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest."l59 
Although the government argued that the classification should none-
theless be sustained because Congress might "rationally have thought (1) 
that households with one or more unrelated members are more likely than 
'fully related households' to contain individuals who abuse the program ... 
and (2) that such households are 'relatively unstable,''' thus making it more 
difficult for the government to detect fraud, the Court dismissed the govern-
ment's "wholly unsubstantiated assumptions concerning the differences be-
tween 'related' and 'unrelated' households."l60 Thus, the absence of 
evidence supporting the government's rationality argument mattered to the 
Court in concluding that the Food Stamp amendment was irrational. 
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the respondent, who 
sought to open a facility in the petitioner's city for people with mental disa-
bilities, was denied a permit to open the home. The zoning ordinance spe-
cifically restricted the home because the occupants were mentally disabled, 
even though it otherwise complied with zoning requirements. 16l After re-
jecting the respondent's argument that mental disability was a quasi-suspect 
classification entitled to intermediate scrutiny, the Court then applied ra-
tional basis review and invalidated the ordinance as it applied to the respon-
dent. 162 Noting that the city council, in enforcing the zoning ordinance, was 
"concerned with the negative attitude of the majority of property owners 
located within 200 feet of the [proposed] facility" and "the fears of elderly 
residents of the neighborhood," the Court concluded that "mere negative 
attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable 
in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the 
mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, 
and the like."l63 
The city council attempted to justify the application of the ordinance to 
the respondent by claiming that mentally ill residents of the home might be 
harassed by students at the junior high school across the street, and by 
claiming that the council was concerned about the size of the home and the 
number of people that would occupy it. The Court closely scrutinized these 
arguments and rejected them both. l64 In rejecting the first argument, the 
Court noted that "the school itself is attended by about 30 mentally retarded 
students, and denying a permit based on such vague, undifferentiated fears" 
constitutes an equal protection violation. l65 In dismissing the second argu-
159. Id. (emphasis in original). 
160. /d. at 535-36. 
161. 473 U.S. at 435, 437. 
162. Id. at 446-47,450. 
163. /d. at 448. 
164. Id. at 449-50. 
165. Id. al 449. 
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ment, the Court repeated what both the district court and court of appeals 
had found: '" [if] the potential residents of the [proposed] home were not 
mentally retarded, but the home was the same in all other respects, its use 
would be permitted under the city's zoning ordinance.' "166 
In Romer v. Evans, Colorado voters passed what became known as 
Amendment 2, which prohibited "all legislative, executive or judicial action 
at any level of state or local government designed to protect" homosexual 
persons. 167 Respondents brought suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of 
Amendment 2.168 The state's main argument in defense of Amendment 2 
was that it placed "gays and lesbians in the same position as all other per-
sons" and simply denied gays and lesbians "special rights."169 The Colo-
rado Supreme Court sustained the trial court's grant of a preliminary 
injunction, holding that Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny because 
it denied gays and lesbians the fundamental right to participate in the politi-
cal process. 170 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Colorado Su-
preme Court's decision but declined to apply strict scrutiny, instead 
reviewing the case under the rational basis standard. I7l The Supreme Court 
concluded that Amendment 2 "fails, indeed defies, even this conventional 
inquiry" because it "impos[es] a broad and undifferentiated disability on a 
single named group" and because "its sheer breadth is so discontinuous 
with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by 
anything but animus toward the class it affects."l72 
The lessons of Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer are two-fold. First, each 
case held that laws rooted in fear and prejudice fail-and indeed defy-the 
rational basis test, holdings that are relevant in the context of evaluating the 
rationality of sex offender residency restrictions, which, this Article con-
tends, are fear-driven. Second, once the Court identified that the classifica-
tions at issue in those cases were impermissibly driven by fear and 
prejudice, the Court refused to defer to the government's arguments ad-
vanced in support of the classifications but instead examined the govern-
ment's contentions skeptically. In this regard, the absence of data 
corroborating the government's claims of rationality appeared to matter, es-
pecially in Moreno. 173 
Although Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer provide a conceptual basis for 
closer scrutiny of fear-based laws, residency restrictions do not fit neatly 
within the Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer framework. Unlike the classifica-
166. Id. 
167. 517 U.S. 620,624. 
168. Id. at 625. 
169. Id. at 626. 
170. Id. at 625 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993». 
171. Id. at 631-32. 
172. Id. at 632. 
173. 413 U.S. at 535 (referencing the government's "wholly unsubstantiated assumptions," 
which the Court accepted for the sake of argument). 
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tions at issue in those cases, which were obviously based on fear and 
prejudice, sex offender residency restrictions are ostensibly motivated by a 
legitimate and important governmental purpose: the protection of children 
from sexual abuse. Courts that have upheld sex offender residency restric-
tions have repeatedly pointed to this important goal in upholding these re-
strictions against constitutional attack. 174 In effect, this child-protection 
purpose shields sex-offender residency restrictions from meaningful analy-
sis of whether the means selected by these laws-prohibiting sex offenders 
from living a certain distance from places where children regularly congre-
gate-actually furthers the purpose of the restrictions: reducing the risk of 
harm to children. 
Thus, although Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer held that fear and 
prejudice-based laws are irrational, they fail to guide courts in determining 
whether a law that is ostensibly about public safety is actually motivated by 
fear and prejudice. The next section will attempt to do so. 
IV. DETERMINING THE EXTENT TO WHICH PUBLIC SAFETY LAWS ARE 
MOTIVATED IMPERMISSIBLY BY FEAR 
This Article argues that high-profile media coverage of child abduction 
cases over the past twenty years has fostered intense fear and dislike of sex 
offenders. This fear and dislike has sparked a wave of residency restrictions 
prohibiting sex offenders from living too close to places where children are 
likely to congregate. These restrictions are not grounded in science, but are 
instead rooted in fear. There are no studies showing that residency prohibi-
tions protect children and the limited research that does exist concludes 
precisely the opposite. However, people who commit crimes, particularly 
violent ones, are generally loathed and feared by the community. Put sim-
ply, most people do not like crime. Thus, the mere existence of some fear 
and dislike of criminals is natural and understandable, and should not nec-
essarily trigger more rigorous scrutiny of public safety laws generally. It is 
important, therefore, to articulate a framework courts can use to determine 
whether a law, which ostensibly seeks to protect the community from harm, 
is nonetheless impermissibly based on fear and prejudice. 
This Article proposes a mUlti-part balancing test for determining 
whether a "public safety law" is impermissibly driven by fear and 
prejudice. In making that determination, a court should consider several 
factors, including, but not limited to: (1) whether the law in question was 
enacted in response to a particular crime, and if so, the nature and circum-
stances of that crime, including its unusualness; (2) if commission of the 
crime served as the impetus for the law, the intensity of the media's cover-
174. See e.g. Doe, 405 F.3d at 715-16; State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 667-68 (Iowa 
2005); People v. Leroy, 357 Ill. App. 3d 530, 534-35, 540-41,543 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 2005); Lee 
v. State, 895 So.2d 1038, 1042, 1044 (Ala. 2004). 
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age of that crime and similar crimes; (3) if commission of the crime served 
as the impetus for the law, the amount of time between commission of the 
crime and the enactment of the law; and (4) whether the legislative record 
reveals consideration of relevant social science data bearing on the neces-
sity and effectiveness of the law. Each of these factors merits brief 
discussion. 
A. Whether the Law in Question Was Enacted in Response to a 
Particular Crime, and if so, the Nature and Circumstances of 
that Crime, Including its Unusualness 
It is axiomatic that "bad facts make bad law."175 According to this old 
saw, heinous crimes often give rise to unduly harsh, ill-conceived and un-
wise legislation. 176 In determining whether a law is impermissibly fear-
based, it is important, therefore, to examine the impetus for the law. If a 
particular crime serves as the motivation for the challenged law, then it is 
also important to analyze the nature and circumstances of that crime, in-
cluding whether it is typical of crimes committed in the community or is 
instead rather unusual. As Part I of this Article demonstrates, the news me-
dia's crime coverage tends to focus on vivid, unusual crimes as a way of 
attracting viewers.l77 Thus, run-of-the-mill crimes often do not make it on 
to the evening news. As a result of the "vividness" bias, the focus on the 
unusual, however, presents a false and misleading picture that skews public 
perception, and, ultimately, distorts legislative priorities. 
Thus, if the impetus for the challenged statute is an unusual crime, 
there is a heightened danger that the legislature, in enacting the law, is 
merely responding to community fear and outrage rather than reasoned 
analysis of what is necessary to protect the community. 
B. If Commission of the Crime Served as the Impetus for the Law, the 
Intensity of the Media's Coverage of that Crime and Similar 
Crimes 
If a crime served as the impetus for the challenged law, then it is im-
portant to examine the intensity of the news coverage of that crime or simi-
lar ones that have received widespread attention. As Ruscio hypothesizes, 
the more we are inundated with news stories of unusual crimes, the more 
likely it is that we believe those crimes are commonplace as a result of the 
"availability" bias. 178 The availability bias, like the vividness bias, distorts 
public perception, which in turn skews public policy. 
175. Mara Lynn Krongard, Student Author, A Population at Risk: Civil Commitment of Sub-
stance Abusers After Kansas v. Hendricks, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 11 I, 133 (2002) (discussing slippery 
slope problem of civilly committing persons with a "mental abnormality"). 
176. ld. 
177. Ruscio, supra n. 22, at 25. 
178. ld. 
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C. If Commission of the Crime Served as the Impetus for the Law, the 
Amount of Time between Commission of the Crime and the 
Enactment of the Law 
The national media frenzy that accompanies certain crimes, like child 
abductions committed by sex offenders, may result in a swift legislative 
response. For example, within four months of the Jessica Lunsford murder, 
Miami Beach, Florida enacted an ordinance prohibiting sex offenders from 
living within 2,500 feet of schools, parks and other areas where children 
congregate. 179 Although fast legislative action does not necessarily produce 
unwise laws, the more quickly a legislature acts with respect to a particular 
issue, the more likely it is that the legislature is responding to passion rather 
than thoughtful consideration of the issues. The absence of a so-called 
"cooling off' period between the time of the crime and enactment of the 
law should raise a red flag. 
D. Whether the Legislative Record Reveals Consideration of the 
Relevant Social Science Data, if any, Bearing on the Necessity 
and Effectiveness of the Law 
Where a legislature acts quickly to pass a new law, or amend an ex-
isting one, in response to a notorious crime, but fails to consider social 
science data bearing on the necessity and effectiveness of the law, there is 
increased danger that the legislature is merely responding to community 
fear and outrage rather than engaging in reasoned and dispassionate analy-
sis. Lawmakers' failure to consider relevant data constitutes serious cause 
for concern. 
If upon weighing the above four factors a court determines that there is 
a substantial danger that the law resulted primarily from fear and outrage 
rather than thoughtful consideration of the issues, the court should more 
closely scrutinize the relationship between the means and ends of the stat-
ute. For example, once the Supreme Court concluded in Moreno, Cleburne, 
and Romer that those laws were motivated by fear and prejudice, the Court 
refused to defer completely to the justifications offered by the government 
in defense of the law. 180 Thus, if a court concluded that a sex offender 
residency statute was driven primarily by community fear and outrage, the 
court would then examine more rigorously the question of whether prohibit-
ing sex offenders from living near schools actually protects children from 
sexual abuse. 
179. Charter & Code City Miami (Fla.) §37-7 (2005). 
180. See discussion supra Part III. 
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V. ApPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK TO A HYPOTHETICAL 
OHIO CASE 
This Part analyzes a hypothetical equal protection challenge to Ohio's 
sex offender residency statute. 181 
A. The Enactment of Ohio's Residency Restriction 
On July 31, 2003, Ohio Senate Bill 5 became effective. 182 Senate Bill 
5, which revised Ohio's Megan's Law, included a provision barring sex 
offenders from residing within 1,000 feet of school premises. 183 Two years 
earlier, a proposal for a residency restriction was included with House Bill 
315, a Megan's Law provision. 184 That proposed restriction would have 
prohibited sex offenders from living within 500 feet of schools. 185 House 
Bill 315, however, never became law. 186 
The impetus for Senate Bill 5 was the murder of Wooster, Ohio resi-
dent Kristen Jackson, a fourteen-year-old girl who was killed in September 
2002 by a convicted sex offender who lived nearby. 187 Jackson was ab-
ducted by Joel Yockey as she walked home from the county fair.188 The 
crime was particularly savage and gruesome. Yockey decapitated her, cut 
off her arms, and disposed of her remains in a swamp.189 Proximity to a 
school was not a factor in the crime; Yockey lived more than three miles 
from the nearest school at the time of the murder. 190 
Compared to the coverage of Jessica Lunsford's murder in 2005, me-
dia coverage of the Jackson murder was much less. A LexisNexis search 
generated seventy-nine stories about the Jackson murder. 191 
At the time of the offense, Yockey was not required to register his 
address with the local sheriff under Ohio's Megan's Law because he was 
not considered a sexual predator. Senate Bill 5 amended the law by requir-
ing all sex offenders to register their addresses with the sherifU92 In addi-
181. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.031 (2006). 
182. Ohio Sen. 5, 125th Gen. Assembly (July 31, 2003). 
183. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.031 (2006). 
184. Ohio H. 315, 124th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (2001-2002). 
185. [d. 
186. [d. 
187. William Hershey, Taft Signs Law Targeting Sex Offenders; Strengthens Notification Re-
quirements, Dayton Daily News BI (Aug. 1,2003). 
188. David Tell, The Once and Future Offender'll I, http://www.weeklystandard.comlUtili-
ties/printecpreview.asp?idArticle= 1962&R=ED95IFD7D (accessed Sept. 12, 2006). 
189. [d. at'll 20. 
190. According to an Accurint search (www.accurinLcom), Yockey lived at 1046 Porter Drive 
in Wooster, Ohio at the time of the offense. A Mapquest search for schools in the area revealed 
that the closest one was 3.12 miles from Yockey's address. 
191. The LexisNexis search was conducted in the News, All (English, Full Text) database 
using the following search terms: "Kristin Jackson" and "Ohio." 
192. Offenders who are adjudicated as sexual predators or as child-victim predators are re-
quired to register with the sheriff every ninety days from the date of their initial registration. All 
2006] SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY STATUTES 627 
tion to other changes, the amendment also included the residency restriction 
prohibiting sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of schools. Senate 
Bill 5 was introduced on January 23, 2003, and was enacted on July 31, 
2003. 
There is no indication from Senate Bill 5's legislative history that the 
legislature studied whether it was necessary to impose a residency restric-
tion for sex offenders, or whether doing so would be effective. Ohio's sex 
offender residency law received little if any critical analysis. 
B. The Hypothetical Challenge 
If faced with an equal protection challenge alleging that Ohio's sex 
offender residency statute was impermissibly fear-based and therefore irra-
tional, a court would first apply the four-factor test discussed in Part IV: (1) 
whether the law in question was enacted in response to a particular crime, 
and if so, the nature and circumstances of that crime, including its unusual-
ness; (2) if commission of the crime served as the impetus for the law, the 
intensity of the media's coverage of that crime and similar crimes; (3) if 
commission of the crime served as the impetus for the law, the amount of 
time between commission of the crime and the enactment of the law; and 
(4) whether the legislative record reveals consideration of relevant social 
science data bearing on the necessity and effectiveness of the law. 
The first factor clearly cuts against the government. The residency re-
striction was included in a bill whose impetus was the particularly brutal 
killing of a fourteen-year-old girl. The crime was unusual and vivid. Jack-
son was abducted by a stranger who brutally decapitated and dismembered 
her. 
The second factor probably cuts against the government. Compared to 
coverage of the Kanka murder, coverage of the Jackson murder was much 
less. Whether seventy-nine newspaper articles constitute high-profile cover-
age depends on the reader's perspective. However, given the vividness of 
the crime, the seventy-nine newspaper articles likely had a significant im-
pact on the papers' readers. 
The third factor slightly favors the government. Though Senate Bill 5 
was introduced within five months of the Jackson murder, it was not signed 
into law until ten months after Jackson's murder. The time between the 
crime and the passage of the law undercuts the notion that the legislature 
acted hastily. 
However, the fourth factor clearly disfavors the government. The ab-
sence of any indication that the legislature studied the necessity and effec-
tiveness of enacting a residency restriction suggests that Ohio's statute was 
driven more by fear and outrage rather than reasoned analysis. 
other sexual offenders are required to register with the sheriff on the anniversary of their initial 
registration. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.06 (2006). 
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Thus, on balance the four factors tip towards a finding that Ohio's sex 
offender residency statute is fear-based. 
CONCLUSION 
Sex offender residency restrictions likely fail the test proposed here. 
These laws are a response to the public's growing outrage and fear of sex 
offenders created by the frenzied media coverage of child abduction cases. 
These restrictions are not based on evidence of their effectiveness. To the 
contrary, they are potentially counterproductive. Lastly, these restrictions 
impose an enormous burden on offenders, many of whom have long ago 
been punished for their crimes. 
Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer, however, hold that laws obviously 
based on fear and prejudice are irrational and therefore entitled to no defer-
ence from the courts. This Article has attempted to articulate a framework 
for determining when a public safety law, such as a sex offender residency 
restriction, is rooted in fear despite its ostensible community safety purpose. 
One might argue that closer scrutiny of laws that neither burden funda-
mental rights nor create suspect or quasi-suspect classifications violates 
separation of powers by intruding on the prerogative of legislatures to make 
laws. However, when legislatures pander to the electorate and pass laws 
driven by community fear and outrage, lawmakers should forfeit their right 
to object to judicial second-guessing of their motives. 
